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A BASIC MODEL FOR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
WOLFGANG BALZER·
Institut für Statistik und Wissenschaftstheorie
Universität München
Ludwigstr. 31
D-8000 München 22
A prec:iJe model of sodal InsUtutions ja dcscrlbed comprislng four dimeoslons: first, a macro-lcvel of
groups, t)'pe8 of ac:tlons, end related notions, sccond, a miao-lcvel of undcrlylng Indivlduals and aclions,
tagelher with suitable relations of intention, causal belief lIDd power. Power ls cbaraclcr~ In a ncw way
emcndlng proposals dis<:usaed recentIy. Third, the model conlAins Intellectual rcpresentatiOllS of items
on thc rnac:ro- and miao-leveL Fourth, it contains a dimension including the origin and development of
what we caU "sodal practlces" (smallest unIlS of socialty relevant behaviour) whk:h g!vea the model some
b1slorlcaI deplb. By pulliDg 811 these items togetbcr, a powerfuJ modcl with a wide range of applications
is a-cated. Tbc claim assoc:iated w1th tbis modells !bat it appHes 10 alllocial institutions whidl are slmi\ar
to systems listed up In thc lntroduc:tion. Tbe way of applying thc modcl is discussed In detall on thc basis
of an abstract examplc.
KBY WORDS: Soclal institution, sodal organlzatlon, model, axiomatlc model, sodal power, soda! pra<>
tlcc.
This paper presents a theory of sodal institutions in precise terms. The theory is in·
tended to apply to sodal systems of various size and from various historical periods
of occurrence, like the grocer's shop next door, all grocery shops in a certain area,
faetories of different size (family enterprise, middle-sized faetory, iIitemational com-
pany), political institutions of various degrees of comprehensiveness (like the mayor
of a little town, the British Queen, the US president or the German Bundesrat), as
weil as structures comprising almost all the population cf a certain area, like the
feudal 13th or 16th century France. These and similar systems provide the data to
be systematized, data to which the theory has to fit. We concentrate here on present-
ing the theoretical picture, the theory's models; questions of empirical application
can be considered only briefly in the final seetion. Our models should be regarded
as "core" models of abasie theory-e1ement which by means of adding various special
laws holding only under special circumstances may grow into a fuU-fledged theory-
net. WhiJe the basic model is spelled out in detail, specializations or speciallaws are
not elaborated here; we can only indicate some possibiJities. The essential insight
associated with this picture of a theory-net as consisting of various specializations
'1 am indebted to D. R. Reise, A. Oayhoff, J. Sander, R. 'I\Jomcla, 1: Voss, and !wO unknown referces
of thIa journal for a-Itlclsm and remarIes on an carller version.
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of one eommon basic theory-element is that tbe basic theory-element usually Is em.
pirically trivial or nearly trivial wbile the whole net gets bighly non-trivial by means
of the different special laws which hold only under very limited condltions and in
very limited domains. 1bis net pieture bas proved eorrect for the most honoured
theories in physics like mechanics, or thermodynamics.1
A theory of social institutions necessarily has to be rather comprehensive. Therc
is only a. narrow patb between its becoming unapprehendable beeause of tao many
features being included whicb are thought relevant, and between becoming simple
but trivial because tao many relevant features are left out. We believe that we are
on that path, and though we may be nealer to the trivial side, our aeeount provides
many opportunities for refinement or specialization wbieh will be indicated in seme
plaees.
In a first step we restriet ourselves here to social institutions of first order, and to
a static model. By a first order institution we mean an institution all of whose aetors
are individuals. In eontrast, a bigher order institution has among its Betors at least
one eorporate aetor. Tbe study cf bigher order institutions involves a marked in-
crease in eomplexlty with respect to the present approach and eannat be addressed
here. We think, however, that aur model will be useful for subsequent construetion
of bigher order models. Our modells statie in the sense of not making fully explicit
the process of the origin and development of an institution. It is clear that ultimately
a satisfactory concept has to comprise these dynamical aspeets as weH. Tbc model
is not entirely statie, however, it contains some Important dynamic Ingredients: 10-
cal features of the origin and development of "parts" of an institution (ealled sacial
practices in Sec. 3). Explicit reference to time can easily be introduced though we
did not for reasens of simplicity, and because mere inc1usion of time does not by
itself revea1 new insights. The items mentioned, origin and development of a whole
institution, did play an important role in the construction of our theory, but cannot
fuHy be worked out here.
Also there is no apace for detailed comparison of our model with others. Tbe
reader will recognize features similar from the funetionalist approach2 in the form
of hierarchies of power (Sec. 1), and from eonstruetivism3 in the nation and role
cf superstructures in our model (Sec. 2). Tbe social practices in Sec. 3 are mod-
elled Blong the Iines of the pieture of evolutionary theory4, and our account of
power in Sec. 4 was inspired by recent work of WartenbergS• What is new is the
way of putting these items together in a precise way, including a precise Becount of
power, in particular. What will be missed is explicit reference to the game theoretlc
IThe basic theory-elemenu o[ Ibo !WO theories mentioned can be shown to bc empirically trivial, sec
Ba1zer, MouIines and Sneed (1987), Cbap. rv. Our metbodologlcat approach is that of a recent &chaot
known somelinles undcr lbe label or "atrucluraUsm". AcoordloS to Ibis approach, a slmplc Iheory essen-
tlaUy Is slven by a class of models snd a clus of so called lnlcnded appllcatlons or inlended systema (i.c.
sels of dala oblalned from real systems by vatlous sysICtnatlc mC8llll). Thc cmpirica1 claim formulalcd
witb a Ibcory is that Ibo Inlcnded systems fit !nto sllitabte modela and in Ihls sense are explalned by Ibc
tbcory (sec sec. V). MolC comprcbooslvc tbeorle& arc concelved 8111.18 or simple Ihcorles. lnlcrrclalcd
by varlous links. Sec Balzcr, Moullnes and Sneed (1987) rar rurtbcr dOlalls.
2Sce Parlons (1951).
3Por 11ll1lance Berser and Luclcmann (1966).
4SCO Maynard Smllb (1982)-
5wartenbcrs (1988).
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approach6. We understand our model as complementary to the latter. Our model
is not committed to assumptions oe rationality and "independence" typical for the
game theoretic account, and in this sense may be said to start from a more basic
level. We do not want to deny that strategie thin1dng and behaviour is relevant and
often important in institutions. Our individual POWER relation may be, and often
should be, analyzed in game theoretic terms (this is why we used the term "com-
plementary" above).7 Basically, our model focusses on arbitrary relations of power
while game theory focuses on more rational kinds of strategie behaviour.8
The following four basic features of a sodal institution are taken into account by
our model First, the model eontains a macro structwe splitting up an institution ioto
groups with cbaracteristic behaviour and different status. Second, it makes explicit
the "underlying" miero level of individual behaviour, including intentions and rela-
tions of power. Third, it deals with the way in which separate kinds of actions typical
for certain groups originate and develop. Fourth, it contains components ref1ecting
the "images", "models" and "representations" which are built up in individuals and
stabilize, end provide sense 10, their actions.
1. MACRO· AND MICRO STRUCTURE
Tbe macro structure, or care, of an institution consiSt! of groups which are char-
acterized in terms of tbeir behaviour and their "status". Behaviour is modelled in
terms of action types, action types being understood as classes of actlons (tokens)
wbieh are similar in certain respec1S. Tbc relations of similarity by which action to-
kens are grouped together to form a type will not be made explicit heTe. In a macro
structure we Ulke the notion of action type as primitive. Bach group is chamcterized
by means of a collection of action types typically performed in that group. We use
a function X, cal1ed the characteristic function, which assigns such a collection of
action types to each group. If 'Y is a group and {71, . .. ,'1'n } is a set of action types
tben X('Y)'" {'1'1> ....7',,} means that each action type 7'i typically is performed by
members of 1, and that all action types Tl, ... , '1'n taken togetber are sufficient to
distinguish members cf r from members of other groups. Members of other groups
typica1ly do not perform actions of all the types '1'1> ....7'n. We cannot exclude, cf
course, that members of different groups perform certain single actions of the same
type. But members of different groups da not perform the same "combinations" or
sets of actions if such sets or combinations are taken to be sufficiently large and
comprehensive: members of different groups "behave differently". We do not re-
quire that the set of action types characteristic for a group determines that group
'Rcccnl lopies are supergamcs and evolullonary game tbcory. see llIy10r (1976). Axelrod (1984) end
SCholler (1981).
71n such cascs, our defmltlon of power in D9 A17 becOIlIcs simUar to that used by ThI'baut an<! Kcllcy
(1959), in particu1ar their notion of fate contra\. In general, boweYer, wo malte no assumptions abaul
ratioJl8/lIy and strategie thlnking so thai. in general, Ibe garne theoretic account oe power and our accounl
a", dlfficull 10 comparc.
sAnotbcr fonnalapproach 10 InatituUons ilI via productlon rulca, as Cound In the wort of R1raro, Skvorc/Z
and Axten, ICO c.g. Ruaro and Skvorelz (1984). In compar/loll 10 Out model Ibey provide a mucb mote
flne graincd lICICOunl oE how aetions in an inatilUlionalizcd pattern CoDow, end are detCl'tllioed by, Oll&-
8IlOther. We tbinlt lhat aI Ibe preseat ttaae Ibis lt more oC a disadYaJllage, Cor many instltutions a1low fOt
wldcly dlffcrcnt kindt oe sequcncea oe aetions. A further, different, applO8c:h worth mcntioDing is March
and SImon (1958). Compare Scott (1981) Cor furthcr oYCI'Vlew and rcemnces.
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unique1y, i.e. that X be one-one, though in most applications this will be the ease.
Status of the groups is treated in a weak, merely eomparative form.. A binary status
relation ~ among groups indicates when one group, 1, has higher status than an-
other, l' : 1'~'Y. "Status" at tbis stage is a very vague nation, a "theoretical term"
of our theory. We speak of "status" beeause of certain similarities to this term's
meaning in network analysis (which cannot be worlced out here, hawever.) The sta·
tus relation is required to be transitive and antireflexive (A3 below), and such that
there exists a group with highest "status" within the institution modelIed (A4).
A core C ofa social institution therefore is a strueture
C = (r,e,X,~)
where r is a set of "groups" end a is a set of "action types", X is a "characteristie
function" whicb maps eacb group inta a set of action types (those "characteristic"
for members of the group), end ~ is a binary "status relation" among the groups.
Moreover, the followlng axioms are required to hold:
Al The sets of groups end action types are non-empty and disjoint. Tbc set of
groups Is finite.
A2 Bach action type in a belongs to some set X("Y) characteristic for same group
ofr.
M The status relation is transitive and anti-reflexive.
A4 There exists one group with highest status.
In the following the status relation will get closely linked to the notion of power
so that a group's higher status basically is derived from it's members having mote
opportunities to exert power over members of a group with lower status. However,
this link to power does not serve as a definition of status: the status relation in the
final model still has its status as an undefined primitive.
Axioms A3 end A4 bave empirical character. We can imagine possible counterex-
amples which bowever, if our models are correct, do not occur in real·life institu-
tions. Think of an anarchist society like, say, tbe Nuer.' Whl1tever grouping we may
imagine in such a soelety, we do not find a natural relation on the groups whicb
satisfies the above axlom.s. This does not show that the axioms are "wrang". The
point is that anarchie societies are not among the intended systems for a theory of
institutions: they are "uninstitutionalized". It has to be stressed that the claim as·
sociated with A3 and A4 is hold up only for instltutions of the kind mentioned in
tbe lntroduction. We have nothing ta say about other kinds of sodal structures with
stratifications that might be described wlth a binary relation among groups. Note
that ~ needs not be conneeted. There may be groups the status of which is not
comparable.
Groups, action types and X may be traced to the Tnicro-level of individuals and
their actions (action tokens). Such connection provides meaning end partial oper-
adonai access to the macro-concepts occurring in a core. We consider individuals,
action-tokens (i.e. eoncrete, single actions in their historical uniqueness) and three
relations among individuals end actions: relations of PERFORMANCE, INTEND-
lNO and exertlng POWER. Variables i,j will range over individuals, and a,b,c over
'See F1ap (1985) for a loc:iologlc:alSludy ot Ihls elCllmple.
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aetion-tokens in the following. While PERFORM has ilS standard syntax:
i PERFORMS a
we use INTBND with three arguments, due to the special context in which it is
applied when we come to define power relations (in D9, A17 below):10
i INTENDS that j should do b, or simply: INTBNDS(i,i,b).
Tbe relation of power we use with four arguments:ll
i by doing a exerts POWER over j so that j does b,
for which we write: POWER(i,a,i,b). This format allows for an easy defiDi.tion
of exereising power. Wo say tbat i extIreises power over i iff there exist a,b
such that POWER(i,a,i,b). In the following, with respect to a given relation
POWER(i,a,i,b), i will be called the superordinate agent and j the subordinate
agent.
We define a micro base MB for an institution to consist of individuals and actions
(= action tokens), together with the relations mentioned:
MB = (J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER)
where J is a set of "individuals", A is a set of "acdons" (tokens), PERFORM,
INTEND, and POWER are relations of the above format, and the following axioms
are satisfied:
A5 J and A are non-empty and disjoined. The set J of individuals is finite.
A6 Any two individuals i,i E J are involved in some POWER relation by means
of suitable actions (te. there exist a,b E A such that POWER(i,a,j,b) or
POWERU,a,i,b».
There are no axioms about PERFORM and INTEN'D at this stage. In Sec. 4, these
two relations will be needed in order to charaeterize the POWER relation, but the
axioms to be formulated there involYe other notions in an unseparable way. So we
abstain from formulating axioms here which would become redundant later on. A6
requires that al1 individuals are involved in the POWER relation. POWER therefore
creates a connected network of ties between the individuals, a tie existing between
two individuals whenever one of them exerts power over the other (with respect to
suitable actions a,b). In applications the sets J and A must not be treated as merely
observatIonal. Though there is no doubt that individuals and actions in most cases
can be determined by observation, not al1 observed items will be relevant for the
system under investigation, and the actions observed may vary with tbe observer.
Some choice and interpretation always will be involved. If we apply tbe theory to
a groeer's shop, and observe a mother with child, shopping and wiping the child's
nose at the same time we may well forget about the eMd and wiping its nose be-
cause these do not contribute to modelling the situation as an institution of the
type "grocer's shop". Such problems of delimiting "tbe" correet sets of objects in a
system with respect to a given theory occur in every field (including the natural sei-
l00Jbe oJdlnaty Iynlax of INTBND is "i INTENDS 10 do ~•• Our Ul8gc may easUy be lubsumed under
tbIl by ta1dDa ~ BI an action wbicb contrlbutes 10 j'a doing a (from l'I point of Ylew).
11ThJJ 1.1 lllIIIetly tbe format used in Dahl (1957).
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ences), and the ultimate eriterion for a correct choice always is whether the process
of applieation succeeds (compare Sec. 5).
A6 reminds of network analysis, and is put forward in that spirit. We believe
that the possibilities of network analysis12 are still far from being exbausted. One
domain of application of network analysis that has been neglected up to now is
that of networks of theoretica1, abstract relations, like our relation of POWER. The
mere fact that power relations are not observable in the same way as are numbers of
telephone ca11s, say, does not indicate that they are not operationally accessible. The
least we can say is that they are open to direet verbal investigation. Moreover, in
everyday life we have fine senses for determining power relations which might give
further hints at operationalization. F"mally, a theoretical term of this kind needs not
be fully operationalized, it may as weil be determined by means of our theory. We
note that our INTEND relation referring to two individuals also yields ties which
may be considered as creating a network. On our aceount, however, only those ties
of INTEND are important which have same connection with the POWER relation.
A full characterization of POWER will be glven only in Sec. 4.
Individuals and actions being available, groups of course can be treated as sets
of individuals, and action types as sets of actions, respectively. Group membership
and an action's being of a certain type then reduce to set theoretic membership.
In this way we may base any "maero" core on some suitable miero base. Of course,
such "foundation" requires further connections between the central notions on both
levels. We have to state how the eharacteristic function and the status relation are
related to the undedying individual notions PERFORM, INTEND and POWER.
No definition of the former in terms of the latter is to be expected. Concerning the
eharacteristic function we first state the obvious condition that every action type
characteristic for a group also is PERFORMED by some member of that group.
Second, and more importantly, we require that PERFORMANCE takes place in
the frame given by the characteristic function (A8 below). Any individual i will
perform only those actions b whieh are characteristic for one of the groups of which
i is a member. Since the group is eharaeterl2:ed by a set of action types X(1) =
{Tll ... ,T,,} this can be expressed by saying that the action b belongs 10 one of the
types '1'1, ... ,7'" : bE 7'/0 for some i:5 n. Tbis axiom is a cluster law binding together
three important concepts: groups (and group membership), PERFORMANCE and
eharacteristic actions. Note that groups are not necessarily disjoined. If an individual
belongs to different groups then it's performed actions have 10 be eharacteristic
for at least one of these groups. Clearly, this requirement becomes stronger with
decreasing number of groups 10 which an individual belongs. The most frequent
case in applications is that of an individual's belonglng to just one group. It has
to be emphasized that the groups eonsidered here are only those occurring in one
institution.
Tbe conneetion between the status relation and the miero eoncepts informally
may be stated as follows. A group 1 has higher status than group l' only if all
members of 1 can exereise power over members of 1', If a "big part" of the lower
group is thus affected, and if the converse of this relation does not hold, i.e. not all
members of l' can exercise power over members of "'(, and a "big part" of 1 is thus
12See Burl (1980) roe 8 surwy.
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left unbothered. This formulation may be emended as follows. First, we may re·
place the modal aspect expressed in "can exercise" by the actual mode. 'Ibis yields
an overidea1ized form, nowever. 'JYpieally, not a11 members of one group actually
exercise power over members of tbe other-even if such events are alJowed to be
spread over some reasonably long intervaJ. UsualJy, however, a "big part" of the
higher group actua1ly exercises power. So a more realistic version is obtained by
requiring "big parts" (and complementary "sma11 parts") in an places of the state-
ment. We da not forma1ize the nation of "big parts", this might be done in different
ways, for instance by referring to the actual numbers of members of the groups, and
appropriate proportions. Also, we might use different proportions on both sides in
order to obtain finer differentiation. 'IWo groups 11 and 12, for instance, may both
have higher status than group 1 with equal proportions in 11 and in 12 of members
exercising power over members of 1. If more members of 1 in this situation are
affected by members of 11 than are affected by members of 12 we may say that 71
can be ranked "above" 12 relative to 7.
We define a micro-based core for a saeial institution 10 be the result of founding
a "macro" eore on same appropriate miero base. 'Ibus a mic.o-based eore MBC for
an institution is a structure MBC'" (C,MB) where C .. (r,e,X"~) is a core for a
social institution, MB =(J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER) is a micro base, and
the following axioms are satisfied:
A7 Bach group in r is a non-empty set of individuals (elements of J), and each
individual in J belangs to same group in r. Each action type in e is a non-
empty set of actions (elements of A), and each action in A belangs to same
action type in e. Furthermare, for each action type characteristic for a group
there exists an individual in that group PERFORMlNG an action of that type.
A8 For any action b PERFORMED by same individual i there is same group of
which i is a member such that action b belongs 10 one of the action types
characteristie for that group.
A9 For any two groups 1, Y :1 has higher status than l' only ü i) each member
of a big part of graup 1 exercises power over same member of y, and a big
part of l' is thus affected, ü) there are members of 7' which do not exercise
power over members of 1, and onIy members of a small part of 1 are such that
a member of l' exercises power over them.
Note that A9 expresses only a necessary condition for the status relation. This
leaves us with the possibility of further constraining it in other ways. One possibili-
ty-open for future investigation--would be to use the mental superstruetures to be
introduced below for further eharacterization: a group can have higher status than
another one, for instance, if it ranks higher in most individuals' images of social
structure and sOOal ranks. The "surplus" requirements in A7 excIude individuals
and actions which do not occur in any group and action type of the structure, re-
spectively. Such individuals and actions do not contribute to the theoretica1 picture,
they are redundant with respeet to the institution under investigation, and thus are
omitted. In an application it is always possible to choose individuals and actions in
a minimal way to make these surplus requirements come out true.
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Because of the centra} role ofaxiom AB and its counterpart A13 to be IDtroduced
below lot U1 use some different terminology for the sets of actions characteristic {or
a group. We say that an action type is admitted for a group (and for each member of
that group) iff it occurs in the set of action types characteristic for that group, i.e. In
the set of action types asslgned to that group by tbe characteristic function. In the
same way, each action occurring in an action type admitted for a group or a member
of a group also Is called admitted for tbat group or Its member. Axiom A8 then
may be restated as requiring that actions are performed only if they are admitted
for one of the groups to which their actor belongs. Thus the characteristic function,
and with it the institution, provides a setting, er a space of possible actions, for
each individual. It may be objected that AB can be immediately refuted by real-life
counterexamples. In applying our theory to a firm we may be confronted, say, with
an accountant performing a bank robbery which is not an action admitted for him
in the firm under investigation. However, this and simüar examples cannot be used
as counterexamples to Aß for the action referred to does not belong to any action
type relevant for the firm, and thus should not be included in the analysis. lf an
action is included in a model then there has to be a corresponding action type, tao
(by A7). Yet the action type has to occur In a set cf action types characteristic {or a
group (by Al), so an appropriate group also has to be included in the model. Thus
the choice cf observed actlons as appropriate to occur in the model depends on the
whole process of application. Eliminating further possible ambiguities, the previous
definitions may be formally stated as followsP
D1 C is a core for a social institution iff there exist
r, El, X and ~ such that C= (r,e,X,~) and
AQ-1 r, e, X and ~ are sets, X : r -. PO(El) and ~ ~ r x r,
Al r and e are non-empty and disjoint, and r is finite,
A2 U{X('Y)!1 E r} ... e,
A3 ~ is transitive and anti-reflexive,
A4 there exists 'Y. Ersuch that for an 'Y E r: if 7 f: 7· then 'Y~'Y.'
D2 MBC Is a micro-based core for a social institution iff there exist r,e,X,~,J,A.
PERFORM,INTEND, POWER such that
MBC = (r,e,X, ~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER),
(r,El,X,~) is a core for a soeial institution, and
AO-2 J,A are sets, PERFORM ~ J x A, INTEND ~ J x J x A, and POWER ~
JxAxJxA,
A5 J and A are non-empty and disjoint, and J is finite,
A6 for all i E J there exist jE J and a,b E A such that POWER(i,a,j,b) or
POWERU,a,i,b),
A7 r ~ PO(J), e ~ PO(A), ur - J, and ue - A, and for all 7 E r and rE e
such that r E X('Y) there exist i E'Y and a Ersuch that (i PERFORMS a),
AB for all i E J, a E A: if (i PERFORMS a) then there exist 7 E r an<! T E X('Y)
such that i E'Y and a E T,
A9 for all 'Y, 'Y' Er, if 7/~'Y then
13We wrllC I : x ->" 10 express thal f 1&. Cunctlon Crom :c 10 ". By PO(x) wo dcnoto \hc power seI
of:c and by zx" IM carteslan produet of Se1& % an<! ". Ux dcnoles the unton oI x (for a colleclion :c of
sels): ux .. {uIVz E :c(u E zn.
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9.1) for a big part,.,· of"'( an i E 'Y. exercise power over some i' E ,', and
a big part of r fs thus affected;
9.2) at most for a small part ,0 of,', all i' e ,0 exercise power over some
i e" and a big part of"'( is not affected by this.
D3 Let MBC= (r,0,X,~.J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER)be a micro-based
core for a social institution.
a) For each ,., e r, each T E X(1) is called a type of actions admitted for (mem-
bers of) ,." and each a E UX(,) is called an action admitted for (members
of) 1·
b) ADMIT(r.0) = ((1,T)/, E r,T E e and TE X(1)} is caIled the set of ad·
mitted combinations (in MBC).
2. SUPERSTRUCTURES
Part of tbe macro core of an institution: groups, action types, and the charaeteristic
function, after a while get represented in tbe mental frames built up in the individ-
uals, they get intemalized and often even explicitly represented by terms in the lan-
guage spoken by these individuals. All struetures thus built up, wbetber conceptual
or not, we subsume under tbe label of supemruetures. There is a simple condition
for thefr development: tbe institution has to last for more than one (human) genera-
tion. This usuaIly being the case, parents from each group will pass on thefr implicit
knowledge about rules of behaviour, that is, about the core of the institution, to
their offspring.14 But even those individuals which are involved in tbe emergence of
an institution (which therefore is not present in thefr process of socialization) inter-
nalize the essential distinctions (groups) and terms of behaviour (action types and
x}-though they may have no verbal expressions for them yet.
Once fully built up, a superstructure covers various items: language, bellers, dis-
positions, and representations of the components occurring in a core: groups and
action types (often expressible in the language) and the characteristic function and
status relation (which sometimes may be so expressible but often are not). We re-
strict ourselves here to those items really necessary in the static part of the theory:
language, causa] beliefs, and representations for r, e and X. Other items that might
become important in specializations will be suppressed here. With respect to lan-
guage substantfal restriction is necessary in order to malte applicable the technical
means avallable today. We represent language by a space ofpropositions. Intuitively,
aproposition is a class of sentences (of possibly different languages) wbich have the
same meaning. Some phiJosophical objections notwithstanding!5 propositions are
very praetical when applied with some awareness of the difficulties. Using the most
economical approach we start with a binary relation ~ among propositions which
may be interpreted as "implication in meaning". The proposition (represented by
the sentence) "I am walking" in this sense implies "1 am moving" whicb is not a
logical implication of course. Implication in both directions yields equality cf mean-
ing, so in a sense ~ is already contained in the notion of aproposition. By a space
of propositions we mean a set l' together with a relation ~ on l' such that (1',~)
14Th1s polnlls c1early e1abor81ed In !leeger and LudonaIll1 (1966).
15Sec, Cor Inslance, SChIffer (1987), Cbap. 3.
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is a distributive, complementary lattice16 with 0 and 1. In applications we may sim-
ply work with sentences as representatives of propositIons. and take the lattice op-
erations ..,. A, V to correspond to the ordinary logical conneetives. Five additional
items will be necded as QCcurring in any superstrueture. Fmt. we need a compo-
nent representing a person's causal beliers. For each individual, we use a binary
relation B among propositions; reference to the individual will be made explicit bo-
low. B(P.p') expresses that propositions p and p' represent events e.e' such that
the individual under consideration bellefs e is a partial cause of e'. B(P,p') may be
read metaphorically as "the individual believes that p partially causes p'''. Alterna-
tively, we might work with a causal relation B* directly establlshed among events
whieh would lead to a more natural reading of B*(e.e'): "the individual believes that
event e partially causes e'''. We opt for causality being represented at the level of
propositions because sodal theory puts more weight on causal belief than on "real"
causes and effects, and because of strategie reasons not to be defended here. Partial
causes are events which, together with other events (te. other partial causes) yield a
"fulI" cause. Tbe problems of causality cannot be discussed hereP Tbe relation of
causal bellef wlll play an essential role in our characterlzatlon of POWER in Sec. 4.
Second, we need representations of groups, action types. and tbe characteristic
function. which are denoted by G (groups), T (action types), and CHI. respectively.
It would be most natural to assume G and T to consist of sets of terms in the lan-
guage used by the individual, and CHI to be given by a set of propositions definlng
which action types are characteristic for what groups. Such treatment iSt in fact,
possible, but the technical compllcation implied is not balanced by direct benefit in
this paper. So for the moment we prefer a coarser approach. treating G and T just
as unstructured sets. and CHI as a function. mapping each element of G in a set
of elements of T. In addition, we use a binary relation e among members of'P and
T. Tbe interpretation is this. Elements of G are internalized representations of the
different groups in the individual's superstructure, and elements of T are internal·
ized representations of the different action types. CHI is same internalizatian cf the
characteristic function in the individual to whieh the superstructure is assigned. CHI
may be regarded as that individual's disposition to assoclate admitted types cf action
with the different groups, and e as it's disposition to subsume some (representation
of an) action under some (representation of an) action type. "CHI(g) = {tl ....'t"}"
may be read as "the individual intemally associates representations th .... t" of ac-
tion types with tbe representation g of a group". and "p e t" as "tbe individual
subsurnes proposition p, which represents some action, under it's representatlon t
of an action type". If all representations are verbal, we may think of p as a sentence
(describing same action), of t1o ....t" as expressions for action types. and of g as 8
term denoting some group. In general, however, we must not assurne that all these
representations "are" verbal. or can be verbalized. 1b the present account verbaliza-
161.0. ~ Is transitive, reflexive, and anti-symmetrie (x ~ y and y ~ x lmplles x .. y), Cor any two " b e l'
tbeit infimum " 1\ b an<! aupremwn 11 v b wilb respeet to ~ exUt, and these Infima and suprcrna aallsfy th;
usuallaws of distribution. Furthermore, therc cxists lhe Inflmwn (resp. supremwn) of al1 11 e 'P, clenoted
by 0 (resp. 1), end Cor each 11 E 'P thete la Cllaclly one bin 'P (dclIOled by -'11) auch thatlll\b .. 0 and
11 vb .. 1. Sec Graetzer (1971) far balle !lOtions.
17A comprchcnslve, llOII·tcebnlcal account oe causallty ls foune! In Mackie (1974). for a tcc:hnlc:al probe-
biliatlc approach aec Suppea (1970). '
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tion is inessential, in particular in conneetion with CHI. All we need is that CHI
be intemalized so that It may guide the individual's behaviour. CHI also may be re-
garded as a rudimentary (representative of a) norm. In a more elaborate version of
our models norms would have a natural place in the superstructures, together with
some constraint requiring identical norms in members of the same group. This is
another point where the present model may serve as a basis for further specializa-
tion.
We do not state special axioms for the relation of causal belief. Some general
axioms might be found by studying philosophicalliterature17 while more interesting
axioms will not hold in general but will be restricted to particular forms of social
systems. Not only will particular causal beliefs in a society being thoroughly oriented
towards magic like the Azande18, for example, be different from ours in the age of
science, but the structure of the whole belief system is likely to be different. There-
fore it seems better to Ieave axioms for causa! belief to be studied in specializations
of the present theory.
We define a superstructure to be a strueture x the form
x = ('P,:S,B,O,T,CIU,e)
such that ('P,:S) is a space of propositions, B is a binary relation among elements
of 'P denoting an individual19 i's relation of causa! beliet; G and T are sets of
internal representations of groups and action types in i, respectively, CHI : 0-+
POeT) is a function mapping representations of groups on sets of representations of
action types which denotes the characteristic function as intemalized by i, end f is
a relation of subsumption between elements of l' and T. The only axiom required
to hold Is that ('P,::::S) be a distributive, complementary lattice with 0 and l.
In principle each individual i may have its own superstrueture. We use a fune-
tion x to assign that superstructure to each individual i in en institution. Thus xCi)
denotes the superstructure assigned to individual i, or simply: i's superstructure. In
order to keep things legible we refer to the components of x(i) by an upper index
"i". So20 'P1,::::s1 etc. will denote Ul(x(i)), Uz(x(i)) ete. In addition to this assign-
ment, in Sec. 4 we will need a more fine-grained representation function, repj, which
(depending on eacb individual i) maps actions inta propositions, groups inta repre-
sentatives in Gi, and the characteristic function X inta a function CHI1• Formally,
repi may be defined on the union of the sets A of actions, r of groups, and the
singletan {X} (see AO-S below), end be required to map each kind of argument
into en appropriate va/ue, i.e. each action into some proposition representing Ws
action, each group into some member of 0 1 representing this group, end the fune-
tion X into the funetion CHi occurring in i's superstructure. We agree that repi(b)
denotes the proposition (sentence) describing action b end rePI(r) the representa-
tion of group r in the lenguage. In Sec. 4 representations as given by the functions
repi will be used to formulate the central lIlÖom for POWER relatiolU.
Starting from a micro-based core we add one superstrueture for each individual
in the core, and we use functions x and rep to assign the whole superstructure and
I'Sec Evans-Pritchard (1937), for CX8IIIple.
19Indlviduaills not made expUcllln Ibis definllion, but wlU be made explicil below.
:lOlL(u) deootC5 lbe ttb component of luple U - (Uh''''U.) (t < n). Thus nl«1', -<,B,G,r Ce»" l'
IIId U3('P,j,B,G,T,C.e»" B. - -, , ,
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their components to the different individuals, respectively. The resulting structure
we call a social schema.
A social schema SS therefore Is a structure
55 ... (r,e,X, ...,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER,M,x,rep)
such that (r,8,X, ...,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER) Is a mlcro-bllsed
core for a social institution, M Is a set, x is a function mapping J Into M
and rep is a function which, for each 1E J maps actlons, groups, and X
into respective elements from some superstructure. Moreover:
AlO Bach element in M is a superstructure,
All xis onto,
A12 For all groups '1 E rand for any two individuals l,j, If i,j both are members
of "( then i and j bave the same superstructure (x(l) = xü)) and the same
rep-function (repI'" rep/),
Al3 For each individual i E J and each action a e A, i PERFORMS a only if i's
representation rep/(a) can be subsumed under one of l's representatXms ofthe
action types in CHf(rep/('Y)) characteristic for one of the groups 'Y to wbich i
belongs.
Function x being onto as required in All restriets the set M of superstruetures to
those realty needed. We calt x(i) individual i's superstructure. 1\vo individuals i, j
in general may have different superstructures: x(l) :F xU). By A12 this possibility is
ruled out for individuals belonging to the same group. In other words, superstruc·
tures within one group are homogenous, and so are the ways different members
represent actlons and groups in the language. In its present form this axiom aper·
baps too strong and idealized. It implies, for instance, that in an institution in which
alt groups are overlapping alt individuals have identical superstruetures. This ?rob·
lem of the formallsm points to a real problem, however. There is same balance
between the degree in which groups overlap on the one hand, and the degree to
which the groups' languages are simitar or equal on the other hand. There are two
ways to weaken this axiom. First, we slmply may blur it, and require that in each
group the superstructures and the rep-functions are only approximatively equal The
precise way of blurring here is not obvious and wnt depend on the concrete case.
Another, theoretica1ly more interesting way consists in assigning superstructures not
to Individuals but to pairs of individuals and groups. This allows to speak cf the
superstructure of an Individual as far as It is member of some group, and therefore
of one individual "having" several superstructures, each one being used in siturations
governed by a correspondlng group. We do not pursue this posslbility her, but note
that the final definitions in Sec. 4 can be easlly adjusted to such a treatment.
A13 mirrors A8 on the level of superstructures. Roughly, It says that eac:h individ-
ual's PERFORMANCE has to be compatlble with the charaeterization of groups
in the institution, but now with the characterizatlon as internalized by that same
individual. This axiom Is important for the stabillty of institutions. One major rea·
son far stability is that the individuals have internalized the institution's character-
Istlc function, and because they behave in the frame given by that function in thelr
individual interna) representations (A13). Using the notion of admissible actions
A BASIC MODEL FOR SOCIAL INS1TIUTIONS 13
we may restate A13 as saying that each individual PERFORMS only those actions
which are admissible according to the individual's superstructure. Thus tbe super-
structures restriet and guide the possibilities cf individual behaviour-in line with
construetivism. Admittedly, Iittle is known by now about the nature of these internal
representations of charaeteristic functions, and our CHI-functions are just a du=y
to be filled by future research. However, even in this crude form the role of the
CHI-functions In our theory as expressed in A13 is crucial. Here are the formal
definitions of superstructures and social schemata.
D4 x is a superslructure iff there exist 'P,:$,B,G,T,CHJ,f such that x = {'P,:$,
B,G,T,CHI,f) and
1) {'P,:$) isa distributive, complementary lattice with 0 and 1,
2) B ~ 'P X 'P,
3) G and T are disjoint sets, Gis finite,
4) CHI : G -+ PO(T),
5) f~ 'P xT.
D5 S ia a social schema iff tbere exist r,e,X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,
POWER, and M,x,rep such tbat
S - (r,e,X,"',J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER,M,x,rep),
(r.El,X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER)is a micro-based core far a &0-
cia! institution, and
A0-5 M is a set, x: J .... M, and .rep : J .... PO«AUrU {X}) x (u{pi Ix(i) E
M}U{G1Ix(i)EM}U{CHI'/x(i)EM})) is such that for all iEJ:
repl := rep(i) is a funetion, rep/ : (A.U r u {X}) .... (U'PI u UGi U {CHIli
xCi) E M}) such that rep/(u) is in pt (resp. in GI) if u is in A (resp. in
r), and reM'x) =CHII ,
AI0 Bach element in M is a superstructure,
All x is onto,
A12 for all 7 E r and all i,i : if i E 1 and jE" then xCi) = x(j) and repl =
reP/'
A13 for all i li= J and all a E A: if (i PERFORMS ~) then there exist 7 E r and
UE CHI'(rePI(1» such that i e 1 and repI(a)E'u.
3. SOCIAL PRACTISES
Roughly, a new socially relevant type of actions originates and develops much like
a new species. A new kind of action is performed with or witbout reasens, and if
the surrounding is favourable, if other people around find it interesting, or impor-
tant or exotic or chique, tbey will imitate it thus starting an avalanche of imitations.
Tbe original action (or actions) plus tbese imitations then form a new action type
in our technica! sense. A similar structure we find in the origin and development
of groups of actors which perform a new type of action. At tbe beginning tbere are
one or more "founders", people performing the new kind of action for the first time.
Other people imitate tbe actions and In this sense become "disciples" of the original
persons. Again, under favourable conditions the process is iterated and alI persons
obtained in the end make up a group with respect to a particular action type. Both
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these processes constitute genidentical entities, for they both spread from a respec-
tive source by means of a relation of imitation, and it is just this whicb provides
their unity. In the case of groups it is obvious that different persona in a group may
be quite different, they have notbing in common except their imitating the "inven-
tors"of a new action type. But also for actions it will bc hard to hold up a thesis of
their having common features besides their belng copfes of the original actions. It
seems hard to identify, say, different forms of greeting one another only on the basis
of the observed events in space-time. Tbe important elue for identification Is that
they can be traced back to other, previous events which are imitated ("learned").
We define the auxiliary notion of a genidentical structure to consist of an abstract
set D of "carriers", a subset SOURCE of D of "originals" or "founders", end a
relation COPY among carriers. (6 COPIES 6') may be circumscribed as "6 is an
imitation of 6'" In case of actions, and as"6 is a dlsciple of 6'" in case of indlviduals
(children count as disciples).
D6 GS is a genidentical strueture iff there exist D,SOURCE and COPY such that
GS = (D,SOURCE,COPy) and
1) D is a non-empty set,
2) SOURCE ~ D is not empty,
3) COPY ~ D x D is reflexive and anti-symmetrie,
4) cach 6 E D can be traced back through a chain ef COPIES to seme element
ofSOURCE,
5) SOURCB contains much less elements than D
D6-4 may be formallzed as requiring for each 6 E D the existence of some 61 E
SOURCE and of 6", ... ,6n such that 6n = 6 and each 61+1 COPIES 61 (i <n). D6·
5 has to be made precise in thc respective conten Different ratios and speeds of
propagation are studled in the evolutionary branches of game theory.21 If time Is
made explicit the number ID,I of carriers at a given instant t may be studled as a
function of time (often an exponential one).
By combining the two genidentical structures associated with an action type and
the group of agents performing actions of that type we obtain the fundamental con·
copt of a social practise. It is fundamental because it is concemed with the smallest
unit of socially relevant behaviour, a type of actions, and the way it originates and
spreads. More complex social structures, so we claim, can be analyzed as systems of
social practises (wlth further properties, of course). Social institutions provide one
example for this claim (see D9 below).
A social practise consists cf a set T ef actions of the same type and a set '1 ef ac·
tors such that each aetor at least once PERFORMS some action of that type. Both
these sets have developed out cf corresponding SOURCES, the set of actions out
of a set SOURCE(r) containing historically original actions, and the set of actors
out of a set SOURCE('1) consisting of the actors originally performing the actions
in SOURCE(1'). SOURCE.(1) may be called the set of founders or creators of the
practlse. It usually is very smalI, often a singleton. Tbe actors may be aootract, cor-
porate actors. Tbis is why we avoid the term "indlviduals" here. The set of actions
aa weIl as that of actors consist of all COPIES which have been successively ob-
2lCompare Mayna~mllh (1982).
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tained from originals snd founders. We need two different COPY-relations, one for
each set. (6 COPY(-y)6
'
) applies whenever a new aetor 6 definltely takes over the
new behaviour and in thls sense becomes a new member of 7, and (6 COPY(T)6')
applles whenever aetion 6 is a copy, an imitation of action 6
'
, 'I\Yo axioms may be
formulated connecting the two basic sets 7 and T. First, they are restricted to con-
taln only elements which are involved in some PERFORMANCE relation (D7-4
below). Actions not PERFORMED by any member of the group can be excluded,
even if they are simiIar to these occurring in T. In the same way we exclude indi-
vidual. w.hicb do not PERFORM any of tbe actions in 7. Such individuals are not
soclally relevant in constituting a sacia1 praetise-though they may be quite relevant
in other respects (for instance in providing the physical means of life for the whole
group). A second axiom (D7-5) conneets the original actions with the founders of
the group. Bach original action, i.e. each element of SOURCE(T), has to be PER-
FORMED by sOme "founder", i.e. some member of SOURCE(7), and conversely,
each founder has to PERFORM at least one original action of the type under con-
sideration. We note tbat the long historica1 development of social praetises resuJts
in the individual superstruetures' being firmly and deeply implanted, which in turn
gives heavy weight to the "frame of admissibility".
D7 P ia a social practise Iff there exist 7,T,PERFORM,SOURCE('y),COPY(i),
SOURCE(T),COPY(T) such that
SP ... (7,T,PERFORM,SOURCE(i),COPY(7),SOURCE(T),COPY(T)) and
1) i and T are non-empty sets, and disjoint,
2) PERFORM ~ i x T,
3) (7,SOURCE(i),COPY(i)) and (T,SOURCE(r),COPY(r)} are genidentical
struetuIOs,
4) for all a E T there is same i E "'I such that (i pERFQRMS a), and for all
i E i there is some a E T such that (i PERFORMS A),
5) for all a E SOURCE(r) there is same i E SOURCE(i) such that (i PER-
FORMS a), and for all i E SOURCE(1') there is some a E SOURCE(r)
such that (i PERFORMS a).
FUrther axioms conceming the COPY relations may be formulated, but are not
needed bere. Tbe concept of a social praetise bas numerous applications, like "con-
ferring a doetor's degree", "taking the boly communion" (Roman Catholic, say),
"buming a witeh", "sieging a town", "performing a campaign (in war)", "electing a
leader" (aay, the US president).
It is clear that the components of a social practise may be difficult if not impos-
sible to determine. Tbe SOURCES often are lost in history, and tbe COPY rela-
tions also may be difficult to trace bistorically. Tbis may create the impression that
the nation ia empty and irrelevant to social institutions. Th this posSlble objection
there are two replies. First, as aJready mentioned, there are no natural standards of
simüarity for actors and actions. h long as aetors and actions are not formally de-
fined in an institution, thc basic approach towards their similarity, and tbus towards
the notions of groups and of action types themselves, is via genidentica1 struetures.
Second, and more importantly, genidentical struetures form a conceptual basis on
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which varioos different forms of growth and of growth conditions may be formu-
lated and studied. By g1ving further, special inner structure to the actors and aetion
types, by introducing the notion of special external conditions together with spe-
ciallaws goveming the COPY relations we may obtain quite substantial structures.
However, just as in the theory of evolution, such speciallzation Is possible oniy at
the cost of conslderably narrowing down the range of appUcations. As stressed in
the introduction, our aim here Is only 10 present the genelll1 modeL
In order to incorporate social practises into social institutions, two adjustments
have 10 be made. First, actors have 10 be Interpreted as individuals for we deal here
with first-order institutions oo1y. Second, we must not always identify a "group" of
a social practise with a group in an Institution. There are important social praetises
the actors of which are distnbuted over different groups of an institution. Think of
the hOly communion, say, in feudal Francel Moreover, a social practise may be much
older than an Institution of whieh it becotrtes an Ingredient. In this esse the "group"
of the sOOal practise will contain many nilore individuals than each corresponding
group of the institution into which the practise has found entrance.
4. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
We now have prepared the ground for iJ:ltroduclng a comprehensive definition of
social institutions. We start from a social schema, which is enriehed In two steps.
In the first step, we assume that each admittcd pair (i, r) conslsting cf a group
'Y and an action type r In the schema's :ccre ls "given" by, or embedded or an-
chored in, a social praetise. Recall that a,core was defined to consist essentially of
a set of groups each of which is eharacterized in terms of the action types per-
formOO by it's members. An admitted pa,r conslsts of one such group and one of
the action types characteristic for that SIioup. Our assumption of embOOding thus
amounts to regardlng each such action t)'pe as having originated from some his-
10rieaUy first events of aetions of that type performed by individuals perhaps lang
ago through sequences of imitations in w~ich the number of individuals acting also
increases. Usually, the group and action 'type making up one admitted pair in an
institution will not correspond 10 a fuH sqeial practise. In a typical case, a group in
an institution origlnally is formed by ind~duals which already are usOO to one or
several social practises exlsting before tlje institution is formed, but there will be
other Individuals usOO to these social practises which do not become members of
the group in question. orten, one socialpractise in this way contributes to admit-
tOO pairs in different groops of one or sereral institutions. For this reason we must
not identify an admitted pair {'Y,T} witll. the full "base sets" of a corresponding
social practise. We say that an admitted pair (1,T) is anchored in a sodal prae-
tise if 1 and T are subsets of the eorresponding sets of aetars and actions in that
practise. This relation is best seen from; the poInt of view of a given soeia1 prac-
tisc P = h",T",PERFORM",SOURCE('y"),COPY(1"),SOURCE(r"),COPY(r")}.
In the formation of a new institution it may happen that some of the individuals
involved are practitioners of the soda! ljlraetice, i.e. members of 'Y". Moreover, it
rnay happen that the action type of the .,cial practise is relevant for the institution.
In that case it is Iike!y that the set of members of 'Y" which oceur in the system will
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form one of the evolving institution's groups, and the set of actions in T* performed
by these members will form one of the institution's action types. If this is so. we
say that the admitted pair (1.T) of the institution is anchored in the social practise
p. provided two further technical conditions are satisfied. First, we require that DO
other action type from the institution is contained in the set T* of the practise's
actions. i.e. that the actions occurring in the sOOal practise determine a unique ac-
tion type in the institution. Second. we require that both PERFORM relations, that
occurring in the $Odal praetisc, and that occurring in the institution, are identical
for admitted pairs, i.e. for pairs in 'Y x ".
08 If (r.e.X.....J,A.PBRFORM,INTEND,POWER,M,x,rep) is a sOOal schema,
P = (-y*.T*.PERFORM".SOURCE('Y*),COPY(1*),SOURCE(T*).COPY(T*)}
is a sodal practise. and 'Y Er, TEe are such that TE X(I) then (I'.T) is an·
chored in P iff
1) T ~ ,,* and far all Tl E e: ü Tl 'f T then Tl nT* = 0,
2) 'Y~l·,
3) PERFORM and PERFORM* are identical when restricted to 1 x T.
Note that the analogon to 08-1 fails to hold for groups. Individuals from düfer-
ent groups may weIl engage in a common social practise. In faet, Ü there are DO
common practises at aII, an institution win not last for long.
For a soclal institution we require that all the institution's admitted pairs be an-
chorecl in thc seme of 08 in suitable soda! practiscs. We use a function y to assign
these social practises to the admittecl pairs, so y«"{.T"}) denotes tbe sodal praetise
in which thc admitted pair ("{.T) is anchored.
The second feature by which socia! schemata are enriched in order to obtain
institutions consists in a detaiIed characterization of the POWER relation. Consider
two individuals i.J and two actions a,b. Then our characterization of POWER is
expressed in the following axiom:
(AP) i by doing a exerts POWER over j to do b if end only if the four following
requirements are satisfied:
a) aetioDs a and b are actually PERFORMED by i and j.
b) l INTENDS that j should do b end j does not INTEND to do b,
c) the individuals believe that action a partially causes b.
d) i and j are members of groups 'Y, I' such that actions a and b are admitted
for i and j as members of groups 'Y and 'Y', and such that the admissibility
of a and b for these groups is represented in i's and j's superstructurc,
respectively.
Our cbaracterizatioD has the form of an cxplicit definition but is not intended
to serve as a mere definition. Rather, we regard it as an ordinary axiom of the
theory which happens to have the form of a biconditional. Such axioms frequently
occur in respccted cmpirical theories; think of Newton's second law. Not regarding
(AP) as a definition Jmplies two things. First, the axiom is open 10 variation in the
"definlng" conditioDs. We may add further requirements 10 a}-d) in order to obtain
more special charaetorizations which do not hold in all cases of exertion of power
OOt onIy in certain subsets of cases. This shows that (AP) may serve as a core for
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a llttle self-contained theory of power in small groups which can be specialized in
several ways to deal with different important forms of power like force, coereion,
and manipulation.22 Second, the notion of POWER is not fuIIy redueed to the other
eoncepts occurring in condltions a)-<1). Rather, it is taken as an ordinary primitive
referring to some feature of reality, and accessible by means independent of the
above axiom. Aß the concepts occurrlng in b) and e) are of the same diffieult eate·
gory as POWER ltself with respeet to operationallzation nothing would be gained by
insisting that the axiom ckfines POWER. On the contrary, there are direct-though
not very reliable--means to determine POWER, for instance by appropriate scales.
Our characterlzation of POWER intuitively may be spUt up into !WO parU, one
part (conditions a-c) concerning the micro level of aetions, performance, intentions,
and causal beliefs, the other part (condition d) exploiting the frame given by a social
schema (cbaraeteristlc funetion, superstruetures). Tbe first part of b) is necessary in
order to exclude actions with unintended causa! consequences (like a car accident)
from the tange of exertions of POWER, tbe seeond part of b) eaptures the in·
sight that POWERexists only where there is some form of resistance.23 Tbe third
"miero" conditlon c) deals with the causal connections between the two agents' ac-
tions. Here the easy account would be to refer to an "objective" causa! relation and
to hold that j's action b is causally determined, at least partially, by j's action a.
However, causa! bellefs may differ between individuals from different soclal groups
(think of magic bellefs, or belief in witebes). We do not want to decide here whose
causal relation is "tbe correct" one. In socia! reality there are frequent cases in
which power is exerted on the basis of bellefs on the side of the subordinate agent
which the superordinate agent regards as wrang or superstitious. This ls part of the
reason wh)' we chose causal bellefs rather than an "objective" eausal relation to fiS-
ure in superstructures. Now we are in tbc position to use causa! beliefs efficiently.
In c) we require the individuals to believe that ps action b is partiali)' caused by i's
action a. It is not necessary that both individuals have such belief. Varying with thc
particular form of power it may suffice that either the superordinate agent or the
subordinate agent has it24• Of course, very often, both of them will have it. An im·
p0rtant example of a form of power in which tbe causal eonnection may be hidden
to one of the agents, is manipulation.
The second part of conditions for tbe POWER relation in (AP) relers to tbc
frame given by the institution, or rather the social schema, in which the events take
place. Aß stressed twice already', the charaeteristic function occurring in the eore as
well as its representations CHr in the superstructures provide a frame of admltted
actions. All actions PERFORMED by an individual in a sodal schema bave to be
admitted, on thc object level (A8) as well as on the level of superstruetures (A13).
Condltion d) in (AP) is intended to make this explicit for the aetions involved in
a POWER relation. Thus (AP) has to be seen as a characterization of the notion
22Compare Wartenborg (1988) for a recent account of theso forms of power. Though the Iyntax of our
POWER relllion II the lame al that of Dahl (19S7) our cbaracterlzatlon of the nollon In D9 Ia not
Intcndcd es a rccollltrUCllon of aoy exlstlng accounL lt W8I developod IDdependcntly, in In attempt to
Pre&efYC the lmipls of other deflnltlonl, of course.
23Wcbcr (l!l8O), p. 28.
241b1a cornea out oncc spedal forms of power, u deacribcd In Wartenberg (1988), are analyzed In tho
conceptual frame set up here.
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of "power in a sOOalinstitution", rather than of power in general. However, since
POWER(i,a,j,b), by a), implies that (i PERFORMS a) and U PERFORMS b),
Ag and A13 automatically imply that actions a and b are admitted on botb levels
in any exertion of POWER. So admissability needs not be explicitly stated as a
conditlon for POWER. In other waMs: in a social schema (AP) above 1s equiva1ent
to a characterization in which d) is omitted. Uslng A8 and A13 we prove witbout
difflcu1ty:
LEMMA. IfS = (r•... ,rep) is a sociolschema then, in oS; (AP) is equivaIent to:for
all i,j,a.b: POWER(i,a,j,b) iff conditions a), b) antI c) of (AP) above are satisfied.
So in the following final definition cf a social institution d) can be omitted.
SI is a social institution iff there exist r,e.X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,
POWER,M,x,rep,SP,y such that (r,e,X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER,
M,x,rep) is a social schema, y is a function assigning a sodal practise y«(")',7") to
each admitted pair (/,,7") in the core (r,e,X,~), and
A14 SP is a set of sOOal practises,
AlS y is onto
A16 each pair (/,,7") admitted in tbe core (f, e,X,~) Is ancbored in the correspond-
ing social practise y(h,7"),
Al7 For all i,j E J and an a.b E A : i by doing a exerts POWER over j to do b iff
a) (i PERFORMS a) and U PERFORMS b),
b) i INTENDS that j should do b and j d~ not INTEND to do b,
c) at least one of the individuals i, j believes that a causes b.
AlS in analogy to All guarantees that all social praetises occurring in SP are
really needed. With respect to Al7 we have severaI further remarla. First, our non·
standard syntax for INTEND pays off here.
A17-b may be written formally as folIows: INTENDS(i,j,b) and not INTENDS
U.J,b). In the first conjunct i and j are different, i has intentions about another
person 10 do something. In the second conjunct botb arguments for individuals are
filled in by (tbe name of) tbe same individual. Here, INTENDSU,j,b) of course
means that j "intends" to do bin tbe ordinary sense. Second, in A17-c the relation
of causal belief operates on the level of propositions, as stated in Sec. Z. Therefore
the actions a,b to be related as cause and effect first have to be represented in the
form of propositions. If k denotes any cf the individuals i, j holding a causal belief
then we have 10 look into k's superstructure x(k) = (pk,:::/',Bk, ...) in order 10 get
k's relation Bk of causal belief which relates k's representations of actions a and b,
rep,,(a) and rep,,(b) : B"(repk(a),rep,,(b». This way of stating a causal connection
in the superstructures (as opposed 10 the level fo material reality) does not perfectJy
agree with causal talk in ordinary language whlch always procecds in the realistic
mode. But as stated above it is causa! belief rather than real causes and effects that
matter in social theory, and a causa! relation among the propositions which are at
an individual's disposal is well suited to express such beliefs.
It has to be stressed that condition Al7 above covers only the mode of actually
exerting power, not that of having power. The latter may be introduced by means
of conterfactuals. Individual i has power by doing a to induce j to do b iff: if i
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would PERFORM athen i by doing a would exert POWER over i to da b. There
are standard ways to analyze such counterfaetuals in possible world semantics2S• In
the present case such analysis would require to introduce sets of socfal institutions
"similar" to a given one.
If in condition Al7 we look at part c) being satisfied for Individual i and at
the first half of part b), we see that POWER(i,a,j,b) implies that i INTENDS 10
acbieve a goal (nameJy that J should do b), and i believes that bis doinS a causally
contributes to reaching this goaI. This Is just thc standard definition of goal directed
action. So in most cases rs exerting power in the sense of Al7 Is a goal-directed
action. We may use this observation 10 locate the speclfic features in wbich exerting
power goes beyond mere goal directed action. First, the goal has a special format:
it consists in another individual's action. Second, some resistance Is present on the
slde of the subordinate agent j: in }'S not INTENDING to do b. 'Ibis resistance
to be overcome is an essential feature cf power as a1ready mentioned. Dropping
it would bring wem Al7 very near to special forms of mere goal directed action.
Finally, it has to be noted that our formulation of A17·b is very weak, and mlght be
replaced by the stronger version saylng that j INTENDS not to do b. If b just not
INTENDS 10 do b she may bave no intention at a1l conceming b, in particular no
intention not 10 do b. Out weak version stretches the extension of POWER 10 those
cases where there is no real resistance 10 be overceme, just undecidedness. Accord·
ingly, the notion of a social institution becomes much broader, including POWER
relations of a type of "mere stimulation". Tbis alIows to cover the examples of a
more economic nature mentioned in the introduction. Also, our weak version of
A17-b alIows 10 subsume those cases26 under the theory in which the superordinate
agent keeps silent about certain possibilities the subordinate agent might pursue ü
he were aware of them ("non-issue" poIlcy).
There is a more difficult form of power which escapes our formalism. We think
of cases in which the subordinate agent has intemalized bis subordinate role, and
identifies his intentions with those of the superordinate agent in a way pointed out
a1ready by Hege!. In such a case we would have "INTENDSU,j,b)" which contra-
dicts our requlrement
"not INTENDSU,j,b)" (*)
in A17-b. We cannot slmply drop (*), bowever, we have to replace it by some
weaker condition, for dropping (*) altogether would reduce POWER in A17 to
mere goal directed causal influence. A natural solution here is to refer to }'S inten-
tions by means of a counterfactual. We suggest to replace (*) by
if j were ralsed under approxlmately the same conditions
as i then j would not INTEND to do b (**)
in order to deal with tbe cases in question. Of course, the "conditions in which an
individualls raised" escape our conceptual frame but they might by systematlzed in
an extension of it.
:1lFor inslancc, Lewl. (1973).
26Lukes (1974).
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In order to make precise all the details of the mode~ let us state the definition
in a completely formal way. The theory of social institutions intrOduced in this way
consists of the class of a1l posSl'ble sodal institutions (as defined in D9) plus the set
of an real systems to which it is intended to apply. This set of intended systems was
roughly described in the introduetion. The claim associated with the present theory
is that each intended system is a sodal institution in a sense still to be specified.
D9 SI 1s a socitzl institution iff there exist r,e,X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,
POWER,M,x,rep,SP,y such that
SI = (r,0,X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER,M,x,rep,SP,y), and
AO-9 {r,e,X,~,J,A,PERFORM,INTEND,POWER,M,x,rep} is a social sche-
ma, A14 SP is a set of sOOal praetises,
AlS y : ADMIT(r,e) -> SP is onto, (compare D3-b)
A16 for all {"T} EADMIT(r,0): {f,T} is anchored iny({"T}),
A17 far an i,i € J and aIl a,b e A:
[pOWER(i,a,j,b) iff
a) (i PERFORMS a) and U PERFORMS b),
b) INTENDS(i,j,b) and not INTBNDSU,j,b),
c) there is k E {i,i} such that Bk(rePk(a),repk(b»)].
5. APPLICATION
Tbe process oe application to some real system of a theory as given by a dass of
models in an areas of empirical science has the following form. First, data are col-
lected and formatted in the theory's vocabularyZ1. Second, it is tried to fit these data
with the theoretical hypotheses. Identifying hypotheses and models28 such fit essen-
tially amounts to an existential c1a~. The data fit with the hypotheses if therc
exists 80me (hypothetical) model into which the data can be consistently embedded,
i.e. which contains "parts" corresponding to the data in a natural way. If the theory
can be successfully applied to some intended system in this sense we may claim that
the system investigated is asomal institution. Aceordingly, the claim associated with
the present theory is that all the intended systems described in the introduction are
social institutions in the sense just explained In ether wards, the data which can be
collected from those systems a11 are embeddable in corresponding models.
Due to the complexity of our models it is impOSSIble to provide a two or three-
page example based on proper empirica1 investigation or data. Instead, let us con·
sider an unspecific system which by appropriate historieal studies could give rise to
a real application. Three Bims are pursued by these considerations. First, we spec-
ify what kind of historical data and methods are required to da a proper empirica1
study of an institution. Second, we want to show that all out models' components
are present and capture important features of real institutions. Third, we want to
examplify our general view of application sketched in the previous paragraph.
27NoIO thal wc dcscrlbc thc process of applyiog an alreadyexiatlns lheory, nol the process of inventIng
11. Tbo theory Is sIvelI beforchand.
281110 hypolbeaca doline Ibo models es thoso struetures In wbIch Ibcy are valid, aod conversely, any useluI
dass of models Ja dc1incd by a set of h,ypothesea.
"Sec BaJzer-Moullnea-Sneed (1987) for a detailed aceounl of thla Idee.
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One feature cf this view which is partieularly relevant to the present theory is that
it does not presuppose a distinetion between theoretical and observational terms
which is often made in order to separate "reliable", "objective", observational date
!rom "merely" hypothetical hypotheses. Such a distinction being very problematic
even in the natural sciences30 we think there is no reason to insist in austere ob-
servational foundation which simply is not feasible. A theory T's data COllSist of si!
a10mic sentences of T for which there are sufficiently reliable means e:f determi-
nation, sufficient reliability often being a matter of agreement in the respective sei·
entific community. Tms view goes together with a very liberal conception of data:
by a datum wo understand every atomic statement whlch can be obtained in a sys.
tematlc way. Roughly, this means that it be obtained from other data or hypotheses
in a unique way as guaranteed by some reguJarity.31 Thls notion does not insist in
reproducability as it oceurs in measurement in the natural sclences (whleb cannat
be achieved in sociology) but keeps eoough substance to malre data a non-trivial
matter of intersubjeetive (and in this sense objective) agreement. In particular, we
do not insist in methods of determining the "objec18" occurring in a system (like
action 1okens. action types. individuals and groups) in a way completely neutral and
independent of the language and intention of the investigator. In the social sciences
it seems necessary and adequate 10 admit for a moderate amount of antecedent
understanding to provide the investigator with a first rough goide for application.
We begin our example by looking at a realistic set of emplrical or hlstorical data.
Consider a system with three groups as realized many times in medieval European
villages: one group consisting of the local nobleman (a count. say) plus bis family.
a second of the peasants and tbeir families, and a third of "intermediate" persons:
priest. teacher. servants.
It seems relatlvely easy 10 determine the lndivlduals and actions occurring in the
system as well as the PERFORMANCE relation. By direct inspection as a compe-
tent speaker of the language or by historical studles we may collect a set of descrip-
dons of action tokens (printed in italics below) together with a list of statements
of tbe form (iJ PERFORMS 0J), j = 1•... ,m about which person performs whicb
action. Also, the determination of action types does not seem 10 pose any partieu-
lar problem for our theory. Things are different for the remaining macro cOIlcepts:
groups, characterlstic funetion, and status relation. How can these be determined?
lf we try 10 determine each cf these notions on i18 own. and independer.tIy of our
theory, wo run into difflculties. Coneerning the groups an investigator with differ-
ent intentions (biological or medical. say) would perhaps arrive at a very different
grouping. Bven the soclologist who understands the system alang our lines has dü-
ferent possibilities of grouping. corresponding to different levels of detail She may
take a coarse grained group structure lumping together nobility and clergy, or the
one indicated above, or proceed even mOre fine grained differentiating, say, be-
tween male, grown-up peasants, women, and children inside the larger "group" cf
peasants. Concerning the cbaracteristic function it is not adequate to take an action
types observed as being realized by members of a group to be characteristic for that
group for in this way we would arrive at many types which simply ljIe irrelevant in
30Sec Balzer (1986) ror a tcecnt discusslon.
3tScc Balzer (1990) ror an elaboratlon or our vlcw or meaallremenL
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the institution under study or da not contn'bute to any differentiation of the groups.
Statlstical consideratians and/or techniques from network analysis are required in
order to acbieve a simultaneous determination of groups and tbe charaeteristic fune-
tion. Wo do not want to look at a particu1ar metbod here, the important point is
!hat such methods da not rely on tbe present theory. By contrast, it is difficult to
Jmaglne any method to determine the status relation which would not use A9, and
therefore would be independent of our theory. So in order 10 avoid circularities it
seems Mse to avoid statements about ~ in tbe data.
In the system of a wlage we might obtain action types of the follewing kind:
71: HUNTING
TZ: EXERCISING for fight on horseback
73: ORDERING
1'4: WORKING in the fjelds
TS: FIGIITING with the fist
. '1"6: SBRVING as a beeter
1"1: SENDING one's children to the Sunday scbool
'1"8: RBADING
'1"9: TRANSMITIING orders, ete.,
and by applying some statisticaI method we might get a grouping of the following
form:
"11: {COUNT,COUNTESS,CHILDJ,CHILD-.2,MOTIffiR.JN...LAW}
'Yz: {PRIEST,TEACHER,SERVANT_l,SERVANT...2}
?'3: {PEASANL1,PEASANL2, ... ,WIFE..-1,WIFE...2,
" .,CHILD'"_1,CHIlD'"-.2, .•.}
and faets about the charaeteristic Cunction, like:
'l"l,~,T3 E X(11)
1'4' TS, '1"6, '1"7 E x<7z)
Ta,1'9 E X6'3).
'Ibe remaining two notions, INTEND and POWER, sre of a different kind. In
contrast to the physics paradigm there is Da measuring apparatus for these notions
funetioning independently oe the observer. There is no hope of achieving such ap-
paratus in the near future but also there is no hope of replacing nations like the
two considered here by other, "measurable" notions of similar theoretical force. On
the other band it would be short-sighted simply to dismi&S nations cf that kind as
useless for empiriCal theories. There are simple and effective means 10 determine
intentions and exertions of power, namely those which every competent speaker of
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the language used in the system has acquired tagether with leaming the language.
These means are c.ommunicable, invcstigators may disagree about the intentions as
expressed by observed verbal and non-verbal behaviour, or corresponding histori-
ca1 data, and they may argue systematically about them (as done by bistorians and
politica! scientists). We think that our abilities of ascribing intentions and power ae-
quired through language competence may be used as a basis in order to determine
notions like INTEND and POWER for the aim of applying our theory to empirical
systems. We admit that these means are not the most reliable ones, but we hold
that they are not unscientific apriori. Th exclude them dogmatically (te. by pointing
to the big brether of physlcs) would mean considerable impoverishment of social
science.
Frem observing verbal and other kinds of bebavior (or from corresponding bistor-
lca! faets) we might obtain a list cf statements about INTEND and POWER. The
count intends to hunt, and intends that peasanC1 serves as a beater. PeasanU,
on the other hand, intends to work on bis field in the same time. Tbe teacher in-
tends peasant_2 to send bis daughter, cbild..:3, say, to the Sunday school. PeasanU
intends his daughter to help him working in the fjelds etc.:
INTENDS(COUNT,COUNT,hunt)
INTENDS(COUNT,PEASANT_l,beating)
INTENDS(PFASANT-l,PEASANT_l,work)
INTENDS(I'EACHER,PEASANT..2,sending)
INTENDS(pEASANT..2,CHILD*-3,work) etc.
POWER(COUNT,hunt,PEASANT_l,beatblg)
POWER(COUNT,ordering,TEACHER,transmitting)
POWER(fEACHER,transmitting,PEASANT..2,sending) etc.
It ls much more difficult to get data, or to aglee on data, about the superstruc-
tures wbich are likely to differ for members of different groups. If we think of a
system in wbich nobility is in close contacl with the court then very likely its lan·
guage will be refined and contain many terms unknown or at least not used by
the peasants. By blurring some idiosyncrasles present in each individual's language
linguistic studies might yield spaces of propositions ('pl,~i) for each individual i
occurring in the vl11age. Also, causal beliefs are Iikely to differ for members of the
different groups. Tbe peasants may believe, say, that an old woman Jiving in the
forest is a witch and may cause certain unusual things to happen wbile members of
groups "11 and /7. do not have such causa! beUefs. Also the priest may hold some
causa! beliefs involving bis God which are not shared by tbe very mundane count.
Tbough all these causal bellefs are hypothetlca! from the soclologist's standpoint
there are methods of different degrees of reliabllity In order to Infer tbem: verbal
interrogation and observation of behavlour (er corresponding inferences on the ba-
sis of historical sourees). It seems sound to assume that at least some of the causal
bellefs Bk(repk(al),repk(bJ» (for appropriate i,j,k) can be obtained in this way.
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Tbe representations of groups, action types and characteristic functlon in the su-
perstructures can be determined if these items have verbal representations. In this
case tbe terms in the language as used by the individuals tbemselves may be taken
as representatives. Otherwise those representations are strongly bypothetica1. In the
example not aD individuals may have terms for denoting group '12 ("clergy" is not
very appropriate), the relations between groups and action types as captured by the
charaeteristic function are not direct1y represented by terms, neither are the rela-
tions of subsumption (t in Sec. 2) of an action representation repi(aj) under an
action type representation from T. Wbere appropriate representatives t, can be as-
lumed in the form of known terms of the language we may collect same statements
about tbe individual representation functions repi : repj(aj) a t, and rePi(1l:) = t..
(tor appropriate indices i,j,s,s').
Tbe last feature to be considered are the social practises from which the relevant
action types stem. These practises are difficult to trace. How and where did patterns
of feudal bebaviour typical for tbe noble persons in tbe system originate? They must
have originated at some time, the medieva1 patterns did not exist in antiquity. We
bave to go back to the early middle ages when the first cavalry armies were formed,
and the European type of tbe knight made its first appearance. We have to look
at the formation of tbe catbolic church in order to find tbe practises relevant for
the priest ancl, later on in 11th and 12th century, for the teacher. Tbe church also
yields same practises for tbe other groups, Iike the holy communion, or the ways of
deaIing with birtb, marriage, and death. Even at the side of the peasants we may find
sociaI practises, for instance in connection with ways of farming, of growing cattle,
of dealing witb siclcness, or just of cooking. All these action types once bad been
"invented" and were delivered from tben generation after generation. It is clear that
a ful1 statement of aD tbe knowledge available about the different social praetises
involved here would blow up the set of data without end. By spending enough energy
it certainly is possible to provide substantial collections of relevant data about the
actions, actors, and the respective SOURCE and COPY relations connected with
tbe action types considered above. Realisticaßy, however, application of the present
theory will not go into much detail concerning tbe social practises.
Having shown what kind of data are needed Cor the present theory, and how
they can be obtainecl, let us now consider the question whether all our primitives
are reaDy important. No argument seems necessary here for the notions of action,
action type, individual, characteristic function, tbe status relation, and PERFORM
and POWER. First doubts might occur witb respect to INTEND. Intentions are an
essential ingredient in our characterizatfon of power (as weil as in human beings
generally) because without intentions and the corresponding requirement A17-b we
would be left witb mere causal influence instead of power. 'Ibis, in turn, would
devaluate the use of POWER in determining the status relation via M, and leave
the status relation witbout link to the miero baso. So INTEND, in fact, is important
to our theory.
A second doubt might arise for the superstruetures. Omitting them would yield an
"observationally equivatent" surface of behavior and core structuro. So what is their
use in the theory? There are various replies. First, superstruetures are the pOints
of eristallization for institutionalized behaviar. Patterns of behavlor can be formed
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only together wlth internat representatlons. Second, superstruetures are tbe carriers
of education and ideology. Institutions typically get "fully expressed" only a gener·
ation or more after their first appearance. Tms is so because for later generations
institutions are a "natural" part of the system. They get firrnly impressed in the su-
perstructures of the individuals by the process of education. As a consequence of
this, thirdly, superstructures are cruclal for the explanation of an institution's sta·
bility. Without recourse to superstructures we simply could not understand wby In
many cases tbe "lower" groups bear an institution for 10ng periods. Though we da
not focus on the explanation of stabillty in the present paper it is clear that our the-
ory is able 10 provide such explanation, and that such explanation cannot be given
without the superstruetures.
The final items to be chec:ked for importance are those occurring in the sodal
praetises. It might be objeeted that these are not only superfluous but even hinder-
ing because they introduce an element which practically escapes empirlcal investi-
gation. Tbere are two reasons why we think that none the less social practises are
essential in a theory of social institutions. First, (in the absence of legal or formal
definitions) they provide the major means for an identification of soeisl groups, and
olten also of action types. In the example, the group of nobility even forma11y is
identified by genidentity. Second, as already mentioned in Sec. 3, social practises
provide a general basis for specializations in whlch condltions of an institution's fit
10 its surroundlng may be studied. The dynamical part of an explanation of why a
particular institution did develop and spread in a particular setting ultimately has
to refer to things h1ce our COPY relations: why do individuals take up and stick to
certain kinds of behavior while they do not take up other kinds. Very roughly, we
cannot ignore the immense hlstorical depth of many of our most important social
praetises if we want to understand our most complex and important institutions.
Thrning now to an exemplification of our general view of the process of appli-
cation we have to ask whether a set of data as described above can be fitted with
a model? We have to go through tbe various axioms, and see whether the data
satisfy them or can be shown to be embeddable Into a strueture satisfying them.
Since the status relation Is not represented in tbe data an existential claim bas to
be made: there exists a hypothetical status relation which satisfies axioms A3, A4
and A9. On the basis of the data in the example such a relation indeed exists. We
may defme it by setting 13"12"11 and 73....,1> no other pairs of groups being re-
lated by ... Clearly, ... is transitive, anti-reflexive, and has a maximal element as
required in A3 and A4. Moreover, the full list of POWER relations available will
verifY-<lr at least be compatible with-A9. Most noble individuals exert power
OYer clergy and peasants, most individuals in 12 exert power over peasants, OOt nei-
ther of these quantitative relations holds in the other direetion. A2 and A7 can be
satisfied conventionally, A6 stating tbat a11 indlvlduals are lnvolved in POWER rela-
tions is satisfied in the data, and the same holds for the axiom AB of admissibility.32
32Illa not eaay to "" bow tbo coI1ectlon oI data hallO proeeed 10 tbat AB wUl corno out falle. Baslcally,
tbc dara aboul lhCl dlaraderlstlc funetion will bcl obtalnecl by obl"",llll many performancea of different
actlons, and use lbeIe es a 1>asis for abltradlos groupl and dlaracterislic aalon l)pCl. Therel'OlCl a
performed action haa 10 bCl to an outlycr In the Itatistlcal sense In order to conrDet with lhCl requlrClmcot
of bcJnS admlulble.
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AItogether the axioms for maero eore and miero base come out true. The axiom
for proposition spaces (AlO, D4-1) is rather idea1lzed, and subjcct to doubt, but not
very essential for thc overall claim that the system is a secial institution. Thc other
parts of superstructures are represented in the data only very partially. So they have
to be completed in a hypothetical way. 1t is not difficult to find a set of hypothetical
superstnletures which satisfies AlO and All.
Similarly, the axioms for social practises have to be satisfied essentially in a hypo-
thetical way, by rcferring to hypothetical entlties extending the few available data to
the full struetures required. There rcmain tbe two central axioms cf 09. The content
of the first axiom, A16, ia that to every admitted pair there exists ("we can find") a
"corresponding" social practise In which the pair is anchored. Consider for example
the group of noble individuals and tbc action type of hunting33. Clearly, hunting is
a lOcial practise even though it is impossible to specify the complete sets cf individ-
uals, actions, and the SOURCE and COPY relation. Therc must be historicalJy first
events of hunting and there is a tradition in which the techniques are inherited. It
seems realistic to consider one of several different social praetises here which may
have been invented independently of each other in different periods and different
regions. Anyway, by comblning sparse historical data with the givcn admitted pair,
it scems possible to claim that there exists same social practise inte wbich these
data can be embedded. The same holds for the other admilted pairs-with varying
degree of plausibility. The axiom for the POWER relation, A17, finally seeIDS to be
satisfied as far as tbe available data are concemed. We see no problem in adding
hypothetical entities at places where data arc lacking (as for instanee data about
repk(a) in A17-c so that the axiom comes out true. Altogether, we think the claim
that the system considered is a socia! institution can be seen to be correct.
In our example we have social praetises eommOn to a1l the groups involved, for
instance the haly communion (as long as the village is small enough and nobility
does not cclebrate separately). One might suggest that such practises are irrelevant
for they do not serve fer auy differentiation. They play an important role, however,
in the internalization of tbe different types of actions and the characteristic !une-
tions and thus may be quite essential for the institution in question. Our example
also shows tbat POWER relations may exist "from bottom to top". Tbe priest, for
instance, by instrueting the countess appropriately, may exert power over the count
Such mutual relations of POWER suggest to apply some notion of equilibrium to
tbe net of POWER relations. Systems closer to equilibrium, so the corresponding
hypothesls, arc more stable over time.
Let us finally turn to questions of explanation. Therc sre two basic notions of
explanation. The first notion, called the instance view of explanation34, deals with
explanation of more complex entities, Uke sets of data, or laws. Such an entity is
explained by successfully applying to It a thcory in the way descnbed above. Expla-
»nte lac:t that ooly the srown up. 1!l81e Indivlduals eng&ge Inlo aetIons of thal type does not yield
laconslslen<:y wlth the IXIODIS of admWlbiUty {or lllc latter are ooly llCCeSfal}' coadltlotu otpedormaIloe.
H1lIll/og Is one of the charaeteristic action types of group 11 CI'lln if perCormed ooly by IOme lubgrouP.
Tbe llIDle holds Cor otber actioQ types In all thc thrcc gtOups.
34Comparc ~rao (1986) Cor a brief aocounL
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nation thus amounts to systematizing complex data into one comprehensive pattern
or "whoIe", to see how the data fit together in some particular way. In this sense of
explanatlon our theory explains sets of data whfch are available about soda] systems
of the kind intended. It explains, for instance, the set cf data described before. In
more realistic terms we may say that the theory provides a consistent picture or
point of view from whicb a11 the actions and relations observed fit together and
makesense.
The second notion of explanation is that of deductlve nomological explanation. It
Bims at explaining an etomic proposition ("a faetj by means cf deducing it from
the theory plus appropriate 'initial conditions. Clearly, the latter type of explanation
is just a special case of the former. Deducing an atomic sentence from initial con-
ditions is a special case of showing that the set of both is explained as an instlUlce
cf the theory. AceordinS to the deductive nomological view various explanations cf
concrete behavlour can be given in thc present theory. We can explaln power re-
lations in terms of intentions, performance and causal belief, we can explaln single
actions in terms of power, we can explain Intentions and even causal bellefs In the
same way. We can explain statistical differences in exertions of power amons düfer-
ent groups, and so on. We may explain, for instance, why groups cf peasants obey
the court's order under condidons in which ther could easily overcome him, and
in which execution of the order is rather unpleasant for them. Or we may explain
why the count's chlldren are educated in a way utterly different from thet of the
peasants' cbildren.
In order to obtain more comprehensive, rar reaching, or criticaI explanations of
social phenomena the theory elther has to be joined with other sOOal theorles3S or
to be further refined. Joining it with some form of decision theory we might ob-
tain deeper explanations of "subordinate" behavior in terms of admissibility. The
basic intuition bere is thllt possible "subordinate" actions or reactions to be evalu-
ated in a model of decision theory in an institution are constrained by the frame of
admissibillty. In the decision model relative to an institution the subordinate agent
considen and evaluates only alternatives which are admissible, so her set of action
alternatives is severely narrowed down in comparison to what would be feasible
in the absence of the institution. On the basis of this restricted set of alternatives
she chooses rationaOy, ie. 8S described by the decislon mode~ but the action cho-
sen might look quite irrational ü the institution would be left out of consideration.
By further refinement, on the other band, we can achieve a real alternative to the
game theoretic account of how and why institutions emerse. The basic "mecha-
ni5m" is present in the models already: Soclal institutions emerge as tbe result of
new ways of exercising power which are invented and found to work suceessfully
in fayour of the superordinate agents. Often, the fun final pattern of actions and
reaetions develops from one single new action type whlch is invented as a new way
of exerting power. Therefore it is not necessary to see the emergence of an insti-
tution 8S the introductlon in one step of a whole flnlshed pattern of action types.
The pattern itself may develop in different possible ways (e.g. by trial and error)
35lp Unc wlth the thcals of unlty of thc IOdaI .dencea oncp put forward by gtellt lChoIarL Seo Baude!
(1980) for an cxamplc.
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as reaetion to just one new action type. Once the resulting pattern gets stable the
institution originates and grows in the interest of the groups in the "upper part" of
thelr eore structure. These groups therefore are interested in having corresponding
superstructures bunt up in the other indIviduaIs, and that is why institutions remain
relatIve1y stable even when the conditions favourable for their emergence are gone.
REFERENCES
AJeIrod, R. (1984) 77u El'Olutlmr ofO1opmllion, New 'furJc Jla&ie Boolca.
BaIler, W. (1Sl86) 'Ibeoretlc:al terllll: A new pcnpectlvc, The lount41 ofPfUro.ophy 83: 71-00.
Baaer, W. (I990) 1be atructurallst view oe me&SU1CIDelll, 10 appear In Minnuota S/udks In W PhiJosophy
,,!Selen«.
BaIzer, W.. MouIlnca, C U., and Sneed, J. D. (1987) An Arclutectt>nlc for Science, Dordrecht: ReideL
Braude!, R (1!l8O) On Hl#ory, CblC880: UP.
BerBer, P. L., lllld LucIananri, T. (1966) The Sodal CotutruetiDn ofRetJllty, Ncw Yorle Doubleday.
Butt. R. S. (1980) Models o! network atructure.ÄIIII. R..... Sock>L ,: 79-14l
OabJ, R. (1957) The concePI oe power, &IuMouml Sc#nce 2: 201-15.
Bvana-l'ritcbard, E. E. (1937) W'UdIcraft, Omdu and MllBic AIIIQIIg w Azande. OxI'ord: C/armdon Pre3s.
ßlraro, 'CI., and Skvoretz, J. (l984) Instltutlona aa productlon 8~lcms. Jollmll1 t1fMadJematiCtl1 &x:icIco
10: 117-182-
PIap, H. (1985) eontUet, loyaUleil en Ilewald, Dissertation, Um-slty oC UIICCbL
Rlr&e. I. (1986) 1be irlstance theiory oe ezp/anatlon, Aurtrr1kuian !oumm t1fPhihroplry 64: 127-42.
Oraetzer, G. (1971) lAIIice 71Ieory, Sllll RaDC:l.co: Reeman &: Co.
Lewis, D. K. (1973) C4wtteifi1dUllÜ, Cambrldge, MA: UP.
Lukcs, S. (1914) Power: A RadlcIl1 Yiew, LoDdon: Maani11an.
Mac:lde, J. L. (1974) 77u Cutent '" thJe Uniwne, OxI"ord: Clareadon Press.
Marcb, J. 0., and SImon, H. A. (19S8) OIpIlutions, Ncw York: Wiley.
Maynud Smilh, 1. (1!162) EvtJlution tmd dIe 71Ieory ofGames, cambridge: UP.
Parsona, 'I (19.51) 77u Socio1 $)GIent, Olencoc, lL: Pnoe Press.
SC:bIll'er, So (1987) RtnI1IJlIItI o!M«l1ling, CBmbridge, MA: UP.
SCbotter. A. (1981) The EcctJomlc Theory ofSociallns/tD.//onI. CBmbrld&e: UP.
Sealt, W. R. (1981) OrgtuIiztltimu: RatiOlta~ Natw't1l, and ~n $yItenu, Englewood CIüf, NJ: Prentioe
HaU.
Suppes, Po (1970) A ProbabllUtic 71Ieory of CfJlUaJily, Acta PbilO$Opbica FCnnIca, Amsterdam.
1llyIor, Mo (1976) Anardl,y and C«Jpentllon, LoDdon: Wlley.
lbIbaul, J. W~ and KeI1ey, lL H. (19.59) 77.. Sodai PsychoiDgy ofGroups. Ncw YorJc: WOey.
Wartenbq, T. (1988) Tbe [Orllll oe power, Antl/y:f~ und Kritik 10: 3-31.
Webet, M (1980) W'rmclutft und Gesd1schaft, Tübin&en: Mohr.
